Journal of Legislation
Volume 46

Issue 2

Article 6

7-22-2020

Clarity or Confusion?: The Common Law Economic Substance
Doctrine and Its Statutory Counterpart
Summer Desloge

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
Part of the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Summer Desloge, Clarity or Confusion?: The Common Law Economic Substance Doctrine and Its
Statutory Counterpart, 46 J. Legis. 326 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol46/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Legislation by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

CLARITY OR CONFUSION?: THE COMMON LAW
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE AND ITS STATUTORY
COUNTERPART
Summer Desloge*
INTRODUCTION
Each election cycle, U.S. politicians campaign on promises to simplify the federal
income Tax Code (“the Code”) and peel back the complex layers of exemptions,
deductions, and credits. “Tax reform” has become a mere euphemism for tax
complication as the book of rules and regulations with which taxpayers must comply
grows thicker. Despite lawmakers’ best efforts, enhanced code specificity has failed
to foreclose room for opportunistic behavior by taxpayers hoping to minimize their tax
liability. The increase in globalization has enabled corporate taxpayers in particular to
creatively structure transactions and apply favorable Tax Code provisions to situations
unidentified by Congress. Courts have responded with judicially crafted devices to
deter abuse and fill gaps in the Code. The economic substance doctrine is one of the
most pervasive defense mechanisms courts have invoked to combat the rise of
corporate tax shelters.
From its inception in the 1930s, courts have used the economic substance doctrine
as a means of invalidating transactions that comply with the strict letter of the Tax
Code but which result in an unintended tax benefit. Over time, Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeal took divergent approaches to interpreting and applying the doctrine, leading
to the emergence of disuniformity and unpredictability for taxpayers.1 In an effort to
reconcile these inconsistencies and clarify the economic substance doctrine’s
applicability, in 2010 Congress enacted Section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code2
(“I.R.C.”) purporting to supplement—rather than supplant—the common law
doctrine.3 Notwithstanding the doctrine’s codification, courts and taxpayers alike
remain hopelessly confused as to the doctrine’s proper role in tax law.
This Note explores the dynamic between the codification of the economic
substance doctrine, its common law counterpart, and similar anti-abuse substance over
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Political Science,
Clemson University, 2017. I am grateful to Notre Dame Law School for the many opportunities it has
afforded me, as well as to my peers at the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their diligent edits. Most
importantly, I would like to thank my grandparents, George and Mary Rose Desloge, for always supporting
and encouraging my education.
1
Compare Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006) with Kirchman v. Comm’r,
862 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1989).
2
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
3
See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE
111TH CONGRESS 369 (JCS-2-11, March 2011).
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form doctrines similarly aimed at effectuating congressional intent. Rather than
achieving uniformity among circuits, the enactment of Section 7701(o) has
undermined its stated purpose and enhanced taxpayer uncertainty with respect to the
doctrine’s applicability. This confusion is further exacerbated by the relationship
between the economic substance doctrine and other distinct but related anti-abuse
common law doctrines. Certainty and predictability are imperative to taxpayer
confidence in the Code, as well as in the overarching tax system. In particular,
corporate taxpayers engaged in fiscally large transactions, especially those undertaken
for legitimate business purposes, and carefully planned financial budgets require
assurance of the tax consequences ex ante. The uncertainty and unpredictability
created by these doctrines ultimately hinder the Tax Code’s efficacy and integrity.
Part I of this Note will establish the economic substance doctrine’s history and
discuss the divergent approaches adopted by circuit courts over the course of its
evolution. Part II of this Note will provide an overview of Section 7701(o)’s enactment
and assess its effectiveness in achieving the simplification Congress intended. Part III
of this Note will explore the economic substance doctrine’s relationship with substance
over form principles in tax law broadly, while Part IV will identify the issues this
complexity poses. Finally, Part V of this Note will advocate for a true simplification
in Tax Code interpretation.
I. THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
A.

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE

“A strictly rule-based tax system cannot efficiently prescribe the appropriate
outcome of every conceivable transaction that might be devised and is, as a result,
incapable of preventing all unintended consequences.”4 In response to this inescapable
truth, the judiciary has assumed a gap-filling function, developing common law
doctrines to prevent taxpayers from abusing favorable Code provisions. One
particularly influential doctrine used to address transactions lacking economic
substance arose out of a 1934 Second Circuit opinion written by Judge Learned Hand.5
Helvering v. Gregory involved a taxpayer, Mrs. Gregory, who orchestrated a
complex transaction for the sole purpose of minimizing her federal income tax
liability.6 Gregory was the sole shareholder of Corporation A; Corporation A in turn
held shares in Corporation B.7 Gregory sought to sell her shares in Corporation B at a
profit, without incurring the large amount of capital gains tax this transaction would
inevitably generate for Corporation A.8 To this end, Gregory incorporated a new
entity, Corporation C, and on the same day, transferred all of her ownership in

4

Id.
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1934).
Id. at 810.
7
Id.
8
Id.
5
6
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Corporation B to the newly formed entity.9 Corporation C subsequently sold the
Corporation B stock at a gain, and Gregory dissolved Corporation C three days later.10
Gregory reported her federal income tax on the theory that under the contemporary
Tax Code, this transaction constituted a corporate “reorganization” and as such, the
gain realized need not be recognized.11 Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
Commissioner, Guy T. Helvering, challenged Gregory’s reported income as deficient,
on the grounds that Gregory’s sole purpose for creating the temporary corporation was
obviously tax avoidance, and therefore this transaction could not constitute a corporate
reorganization within the meaning of the Code.12 While conceding that the transaction
was undertaken to mitigate her tax liability, Gregory appealed the deficiency to the
Board of Tax Appeals, contending her underlying motivation was irrelevant to her tax
liability. The Board of Tax Appeals expunged the deficiency, finding that under a
strict reading of the Code, this transaction constituted a corporate reorganization
irrespective of Gregory’s purpose for engaging in the reorganization.13
The Second Circuit reversed this determination on appeal, ruling in favor of the
Commissioner.14 Writing for the court, Judge Learned Hand opined that while a
“transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity,
because it is actuated by the desire to avoid, or . . . to evade, taxation,” dodging “the
shareholders' taxes is not one of the transactions contemplated as corporate
reorganizations.”15 Based on the Code provision’s history and legislative intent, Judge
Hand concluded that “the transactions were no part of the conduct of the business of
either or both companies[,]” and therefore did not satisfy the definition of a corporate
reorganization.16 In essence, although the transaction fit within the literal definition of
a corporate reorganization, the transaction was not one which Congress had intended
to benefit from this provision.
Gregory appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the Second
Circuit’s holding.17 The Court echoed Judge Hand’s rationale, opining, “[t]he whole
undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of [the Code provision], was in
fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization, and nothing else.”18 The transaction could not fit within the definition
9

Id.
Id.
11
Id. Section 112(i)(1)(B) of the Revenue Act of 1928 defined a “reorganization” as “a transfer by a
corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or
its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred.” I.R.C. §
112(i)(1)(B) (1928). Section 112(g) provided that gain realized pursuant to a corporate reorganization shall
not be recognized. See § 112(g).
12
Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 811.
15
Id. at 810–11.
16
Id. at 811. Judge Hand reasoned that “the underlying presupposition is plain that the re-adjustment
shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident,
egregious to its prosecution.” Id. Moreover, notwithstanding the legitimacy of the steps taken, “their only
defect was that they were not what the statute mean[t] by a ‘reorganization,’ because the transactions were no
part of the conduct of the business of either or both companies; so viewed, they were a sham, though all the
proceedings had their usual effect.” Id.
17
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
18
Id. at 470.
10
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of a corporate reorganization “because the transaction upon its face lies outside the
plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality
and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.”19
B.

COMMON LAW EVOLUTION

The economic substance doctrine emerged out of Judge Hand’s substance over
form interpretation of the Tax Code in Helvering v. Gregory. Today, the economic
substance doctrine is available as a judicial remedy to transactions in which “a taxpayer
seeks to claim tax benefits, unintended by Congress, by means of transactions that
serve no economic purpose other than tax savings.”20 The doctrine’s scope is not
limited to corporate taxpayers or transactions, “but rather applies to the federal taxing
statutes generally.”21 Because the doctrine developed at common law, its precise form
varies by jurisdiction. Most federal courts apply a variation of the modern two-part
test articulated by the Tax Court in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner.22 First, the
court inquires “whether the transaction has any practical economic effects other than
the creation of income tax losses.”23 If this threshold inquiry is answered in the
affirmative, the second separate but related question is whether the taxpayer engaged
in the transaction for a legitimate non-tax business purpose.24
The test’s first prong, commonly referred to as the “economic prong,” is an
objective inquiry dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of a given
transaction.25 A transaction has a non-tax economic effect if it “offers a reasonable
opportunity for economic profit, that is, profit exclusive of tax benefits.”26 The second
prong, known as the “business purpose test,” looks to the taxpayer’s subjective
“expectations and motives” for engaging in the transaction.27 To withstand scrutiny
under the test’s second leg, the taxpayer must establish a motive unrelated to obtaining
beneficial tax treatment. A transaction that “is compelled or encouraged by business
or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not
19

Id.
ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. 1997–115 1997 WL 93314, at *36, aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
ACM P’ship v. C.I.R. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
21
Id. at *38 (internal quotations omitted).
22
Id. The Tax Court recognized the hazy line between the production of profit and the reduction in
taxes. The court nonetheless concluded that tax law “requires that the intended transactions have economic
substance separate and distinct from economic benefit achieved solely by tax reduction.” Id. at *36.
23
ACM, 157 F.3d at 248 (quoting Jacobson v. Comm’r, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also
Nicholas Giordano, Putting the Substance Back into the Economic Substance Doctrine, 11 BROOK. J. OF
CORP., FIN., AND COMM. L. 469, 470 (2017).
24
ACM, 157 F.3d at 248.
25
See, e.g., Tucker v. Comm’r, 766 Fed. Appx. 132 (5th Cir. 2019).
26
Portland Golf Club v. Comm’r, 497 U.S. 154, 169 n.19 (1990) (quoting Gefen v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.
1471, 1490 (1986)).
27
Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 27 (2000) (“The
[subjective] leg is similar, if not identical, to the business purpose doctrine, and is sometimes simply referred
to as the business purpose requirement.”). Bankman critiques the subjective prong on the grounds that it is
“impossible to know a taxpayer's (or anyone else's) actual subjective intent.” Id. Moreover, the subjective
prong “must inevitably look to objective indicia of intent: contemporaneous documents, evidence of meetings,
and the like. These indicia may be subject to manipulation. A primary criticism of the business purpose test is
that it leads to the creation of false or misleading documents that evidence nontax motives.” Id.
20
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shaped solely by tax-avoidance features” will satisfy the second prong.28 Conversely,
a transaction lacking “economic substance separate and distinct from economic benefit
achieved solely by tax reduction[,]”29 will be denied the provision’s afforded benefit
and a penalty may be imposed.
C.

A CIRCUIT SPLIT EMERGES

Despite its prevalence in tax law, federal courts disagree as to the economic
substance doctrine’s proper application.30 The ways in which the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal apply the common law economic substance doctrine diverge in three
primary respects: (1) the test’s structure; (2) the test’s relevance; and (3) the necessary
threshold for establishing the existence of economic substance. Understanding each
of these departures is helpful in assessing the statutory changes accompanying Section
7701(o)’s enactment.
Federal courts have traditionally disagreed as to the doctrine’s proper structure.
Prior to the 2010 legislation, some courts applied a strict conjunctive test, requiring
both the objective and subjective prongs be satisfied, 31 while other circuits applied a
more lenient disjunctive test, allowing the taxpayer to withstand the test by establishing
either the objective or subjective prong.32 Still other circuits took a holistic approach,
evaluating the nature of the transaction as a whole, and rejecting to distinguish between
the objective and subjective prongs.33 The 2010 legislation eradicated this particular
discrepancy in the test’s application by mandating that all courts apply the test in its
conjunctive form.34 Under this approach, “[t]he threshold question is whether the
transaction has economic substance.”35 If the answer is yes, the question becomes
whether the taxpayer was “motivated by profit to participate in the transaction.”36
In addition to the test’s structure, there is also a lack of consensus among courts
as to the proper context in which the economic substance doctrine is relevant. As the
Fifth Circuit observed, “the line between disregarding a too-clever-by-half accounting
28

Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978).
ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. 1997–115 1997 WL 93314, at *36, aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
ACM P’ship v. C.I.R. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
30
Compare Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006) with Kirchman v. Comm’r,
862 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1989).
31
The Fifth, Sixth, and Federal Circuits apply a form of the stricter conjunctive test, preventing
economic substance in the absence of a showing meeting both prongs of the test. See, e.g., Dow Chem., 435
F.3d; Boca Investerings P’ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003); In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301
F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2002); United Parcel Serv. of Am., v. Comm’r, 253 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the
conjunctive test, as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained, “[w]hile the doctrine may well also
apply if the taxpayer’s sole subjective motivation is tax avoidance even if the transaction has economic
substance, a lack of economic substance is sufficient to disqualify the transaction without proof that the
taxpayer’s sole motive is tax avoidance.” Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
32
In contrast, the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits only require one prong be satisfied as a
prerequisite to finding economic substance. See, e.g., Kirchman, 862 F.2d at 1490.
33
See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); Sacks v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 985
(9th Cir. 1995); James v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 905, 908 (10th Cir. 1995).
34
See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2018).
35
Pasternak v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993).
36
Id.
29
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trick and nullifying a Code-supported, tax-minimizing transaction can be elusive.”37
While some circuits have restricted the doctrine’s application to corporate transactions,
others have taken a more liberal approach, invoking the doctrine against individual
taxpayers as well. As elaborated on in Part II of this Note, the legislature abstained
from guiding courts and taxpayers on the appropriate context for the economic
substance doctrine, but rather left this matter to the court’s discretion.38
Finally, “[t]here is also a lack of uniformity regarding the type of non-tax
economic benefit a taxpayer must establish in order to demonstrate that a transaction
has economic substance.”39 For instance, a taxpayer who did not realize the purported
business benefits of a transaction is at risk of being stripped of a claimed tax benefit in
some jurisdictions.40 On the other hand, some courts have denied a tax benefit in a
transaction where the risk-to-profit potential is disproportionately large.41 Still other
courts have entertained the notion that tax benefits could be a permissible motivating
factor in deciding to engage in a particular transaction, so long as it was not the
taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the transaction.42 These disparities
between circuits served as a catalyst for the economic substance doctrine’s legislative
enactment in 2010.
II. CONGRESSIONAL “CLARIFICATION”
In 2010, Congress enacted a statutory version of the economic substance doctrine
with the stated intent not of displacing the common law doctrine, but rather providing
clarification surrounding its application and cultivating uniformity across circuits.43
Ironically, by leaving the common law doctrine intact and adding an additional layer
of complexity to an area with pre-existing divergent interpretation, the statute had the
opposite effect. Instead of clarifying the doctrine as Congress intended, the statute has
further complicated the framework, creating more uncertainty for both taxpayers and
courts. As provided by I.R.C. Section 7701(o), any transaction entered into after
March 31, 2010,
37

Summa Holdings v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 779, 787 (6th Cir. 2017).
According to the Sixth Circuit, indicia of either the presence of economic substance or a lack thereof
include, “the presence or absence of arm's-length price negotiations, the relationship between the sales price
and fair market value, the structure of financing of the transaction, whether there was a shifting of the benefits
and burdens of ownership, and the degree of adherence to contractual terms.” Rose v. C.I.R., 88 T.C. 386,
Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 43,687, 410–11 (1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1989). A lack of economic
substance can be further corroborated by evidence that “[t]ax benefits were the focus of promotional materials
. . . [or] the assets in question consist of packages of purported rights, difficult to value in the abstract and
substantially overvalued in relation to tangible property included as part of the package . . . .” Id. at 412.
39
See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE
111TH CONGRESS 369, 371 (JCS-2-11, March 2011).
40
See, e.g., Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
41
See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
42
Rebecca Rosenberg, Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine: Substantive Impact and
Unintended Consequences, HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 55, 94–95 (2019).
43
See Rebecca Rosenberg, Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine: Agency Response and
Certain Other Unforeseen Consequences, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 199 (2018). Congressional intent is
further informed and corroborated by the subsection’s title “Clarification of the Economic Substance
Doctrine,” as well as I.R.C. § 7701(5)(A) (2018), which defines the doctrine by way of reference to the
common law.
38
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to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such
transaction is treated as having economic substance only if (1) the
transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income
tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (2) the taxpayer
has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for
entering into such transaction.44
While cases involving the economic substance doctrine have been litigated since
Section 7701(o)’s enactment, a federal court has yet to interpret the statute.45
Consequently, the impact the statutory overlay will have on courts’ application of the
common law doctrine will be determined in time. Until then, the only means of
assessing the statute’s effectiveness are the text and legislative history of the statute
itself.
Congress explicitly assured courts and taxpayers alike that Section 7701(o) was
not enacted as an effort to displace the common law doctrine.46 Rather, the statute’s
legislative history manifests Congress’s unambiguous intent to clarify the test’s
application and in turn, eliminate the disparities among federal circuits.47 Given the
lack of uniformity among courts and the general disagreement regarding the economic
substance doctrine’s proper application, there is an inherent tension between these two
policy objectives. This raises the question: which doctrinal aspects are courts bound
to comply with and which aspects are left to judicial discretion?
The statutory enactment of Section 7701(o) made three fundamental doctrinal
alterations to the common law economic substance doctrine. First, the statute unified
the doctrine’s form by requiring the test be applied in its conjunctive form.48
Additionally, the statute significantly reformed the objective prong of the test by
requiring the transaction in question change the taxpayer’s economic position in a
“meaningful way”49 Finally, the statute slightly reformed the test’s subjective prong
by broadly defining “transaction” so as to include a series of transactions.50
Notwithstanding these modifications, Section 7701(o) has largely failed to clarify the
economic substance doctrine’s relevance in tax law.
A.

UNIFICATION IN FORM: THE CONJUNCTIVE TEST

The statute unambiguously mandates that in transactions to which the doctrine is
relevant courts must analyze the economic substance of the transaction through a two44

See § 7701(o)(1).
Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 66. This is due to the fact that the transactions in recent cases have all
occurred prior to the statute’s effective date. Id.
46
See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE
111TH CONGRESS 369, 379 (JCS-2-11, March 2011).
47
Id. at 378 (“The provision clarifies and enhances the application of the economic substance doctrine . .
. [t]he provision provides a uniform definition of economic substance, but does not alter the flexibility of the
courts in other respects.”).
48
See § 7701(o)(1).
49
See id. § 7701(o)(1)(A).
50
See id. § 7701(o)(5)(D).
45
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part conjunctive test.51 To establish the economic substance of a transaction, the
taxpayer bears the burden of showing the challenged transaction “change[d] in a
meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic
position and the taxpayer must have a substantial non-Federal-income-tax purpose for
entering into such a transaction, in order for a transaction to be treated as having
economic substance.”52
As explained by the Joint Committee on Taxation, “[t]his clarification eliminates
the disparity that exists among the Federal circuit courts regarding the application of
the doctrine, and modifies its application in those circuits in which either a change in
economic position or a non-tax business purpose (without having both) is sufficient to
satisfy the economic substance doctrine.”53 Critics of the statutory enactment contend
that this clarification will not realistically eradicate much disparity because “a circuit's
particular framing of the economic substance test (conjunctive, disjunctive, flexible,
or other) [typically] made no difference to the result of an economic substance case.”54
Nonetheless, by requiring the test be applied in its conjunctive form, the legislature
eliminated the discretion courts previously had to adopt a disjunctive or holistic
assessment, thereby cultivating convergence in the doctrine’s structure. In this regard,
Congress achieved its objective of unifying judicial application of the doctrine. Not
only does this alteration create uniformity in application, but by requiring that both
prongs be satisfied, Congress heightened the burden of persuasion for corporate
taxpayers in circuits previously allowing just one prong to satisfy the test. As one
scholar explained, “Section 7701(o) gives the government a better chance of
disallowing a tax benefit, because now it only needs to win one of the two prongs (and
taxpayers, conversely, must meet both in every circuit.”55
B.

STATUTORY ALTERATIONS TO THE OBJECTIVE PRONG

Section 7701(o) further altered the common law doctrine’s objective prong by
requiring that the transaction change the taxpayer’s economic position in a
“meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects).”56 Nonetheless, the Code
fails to define what constitutes a meaningful change in economic position and the
Treasury has yet to issue any guidance on this point. Moreover, Congress was adamant
that where the statute is silent, or where terms remain undefined, courts are to continue
applying common law doctrine as if the statue had never been enacted:
No inference is intended as to the proper application of the economic
substance doctrine under present law. The provision is not intended
51
See id. § 7701(o)(1). This is supported by both the statutory language, as well as the legislative history
of the provision. “there must be an inquiry regarding the objective effects of the transaction on the taxpayer’s
economic position as well as an inquiry regarding the taxpayer’s subjective motives for engaging in the
transaction.” JCS-2-11 at 380.
52
JCS-2-11 at 378.
53
Id. at 380.
54
Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 61.
55
Id. at 72.
56
See § 7701(o)(1)(A).
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to alter or supplant any other rule of law, including any common-law
doctrine or provision of the Code or regulations or other guidance
thereunder; and it is intended the provision be construed as being
additive to any such other rule of law.57
In this sense, the requirement that the change in economic position be “meaningful” is
hardly useful in bringing congruity to the doctrine’s application. Courts retain great
deference in deciding what constitutes “meaningful” and could theoretically set the
threshold so low as to effectively dispense with the requirement all together.
C.

STATUTORY ALTERATIONS TO THE SUBJECTIVE PRONG

Similarly, Section 7701(o) imposes an additional requirement on the taxpayer by
requiring the taxpayer’s motive behind engaging in a particular transaction be
“substantial.”58 The Joint Taxation Committee clarified that an accounting motive
does not qualify as a significant non-federal-income tax benefit for purposes of this
section.59
Moreover, the statute broadly defines the term “transaction” as including a series
of transactions.60 The Joint Committee on Taxation reiterated its position that “[t]he
provision does not alter the court’s ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise
recharacterize a transaction when applying the doctrine.”61 Thus, the statutory
interpretation is left to the discretion of the courts, leaving ample room for divergence
in interpretation among the circuits.62 Further, according to the House Report, “[t]he
provision is not intended to alter the tax treatment of certain basic business transactions
that, under longstanding judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely
because meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based on comparative
tax advantages.”63 Exempting certain business transactions provides some direction
for courts and an opportunity to create uniformity across jurisdictions.

57

JCS-2-11 at 381.
See § 7701(o)(1)(B).
59
JCS-2-11 at 381.
60
See § 7701(o)(5)(D).
61
JCS-2-11 at 379.
62
But see Rosenberg, supra note 43 (arguing the requirement enhances uniformity in the application of
the doctrine by forcing courts to consider more than just profit when analyzing a change in economic
position).
63
H.R. REP. No. 111-443, at 296 (2010).
“Among these basic transactions are (1) the choice between capitalizing a business
enterprise with debt or equity; (2) a U.S. person's choice between utilizing a foreign corporation
or a domestic corporation to make a foreign investment; (3) the choice to enter a transaction or
series of transactions that constitute a corporate organization or reorganization under
subchapter C; and (4) the choice to utilize a related-party entity in a transaction, provided that
the arm's length standard of section 482 and other applicable concepts are satisfied. Leasing
transactions, like all other types of transactions, will continue to be analyzed in light of all the
facts and circumstances.” Id. at 228.
58
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EVALUATING “CLARIFICATION” OF THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE

By requiring that both the objective and subjective prongs of the test be satisfied
to establish economic substance in a transaction, Section 7701(o) heightens the burden
of proof for the taxpayer and removes judicial discretion in deciding which form of the
test to apply.64 In addition to making it more challenging for a taxpayer to overcome
this challenge, the Legislature also heightened the stakes for taxpayers who run astray
of the economic substance doctrine. To further deter corporate Tax Code abuse, the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act implemented Section 6662(b)(6), which
imposes a penalty in the amount of twenty percent of “any portion of an underpayment
on a return” attributable to a transaction which is determined to lack economic
substance.65 If a taxpayer fails to adequately disclose such a transaction, the penalty
imposed doubles to forty percent of the transaction’s value.66 This penalty provision
substantially increases the risks associated with violating the economic substance
doctrine.
Despite the alterations the statutory enactment brought to the common law
economic substance doctrine, Section 7701(o) largely failed to clarify the doctrine’s
applicability. First, the Legislature intentionally refrained from clarifying the
doctrine’s “relevance” or otherwise indicate which transactions trigger the economic
substance doctrine. This is unambiguously evidenced by the Joint Committee on
Taxation’s report which explicitly notes, “[t]he determination of whether the economic
substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction is made in the manner as traditionally
has been (as if Section 7701(o) had never been enacted).”67 Similarly, the IRS has
declined to provide guidance on when the doctrine is relevant. In a public notice, the
Service stated “the IRS will continue to rely on relevant case law under the common
law economic substance doctrine in applying the two-prong conjunctive test in
[S]ection 7701(o)(1).”68 Congress left open the possibility that the doctrine could
apply to individuals and corporate entities alike. However, for individuals, the scope
of applicability is confined to transactions in connection with a trade, business, or an
activity engaged with the purpose of producing income.69 Without any direction courts
will continue applying the economic substance doctrine in accordance with jurisdiction
specific case law. As a result, the legislature fails to resolve any of the pre-legislative

64

See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 208–09.
I.R.C. § 6662(i)(1) (2018).
66
Id. § 6662(i)(1).
67
See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE
111TH CONGRESS 369, 378 (JCS-2-11, March 2011); see also Codification of the Economic Substance and
Effected Penalties, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, CIVIL PENALTIES AND ADDITIONAL TAX
(noting that to determine whether a taxpayer’s economic position is sufficiently altered so as to satisfy the first
prong, “the Service will apply cases under the common law economic substance doctrine pertaining to whether
the tax benefits of a transaction are not allowable because the transaction does not satisfy the economic
substance prong of the economic substance doctrine”).
68
I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). Rosenberg contends that taxpayers could
plausibly argue that this notice should be interpreted as the IRS treating the doctrine unchanged by the recent
statutory enactment. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 216.
69
JCS-2-11 at 381.
65
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ambiguity regarding the doctrine’s relevance and instead, provided vast opportunity
for variance between circuits.
Further, the statute fails to clarify when and how the doctrine is to be applied by
the courts. Section 7701(o) abstains from defining what constitutes a “transaction” or
a meaningful economic change in position.70 Moreover, courts remain free to
aggregate or disaggregate transactions in accordance with their own common law
precedent. Thus, circuit courts will continue applying the doctrine differently. Rather
than creating certainty in the doctrine’s application, however, the codification created
a divide between Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal in how the doctrine is interpreted
and applied.71
In sum, the most important alteration to the economic substance doctrine’s
application implemented by Section 7701(o) is the elimination of the disjunctive test
and the requirement that taxpayers satisfy both prongs of the test. Moreover, the statute
requires the change in economic position be “meaningful” and provides a broad
definition of what constitutes a “transaction.” In these regards, Congress successfully
clarified the doctrine’s proper application. Nonetheless, the statute falls short of
attaining this objective in many regards. By instructing courts to apply the test
predominantly in the same manner as before the statute was enacted, courts retain
significant discretion to determine when, and how, the test is applied. Because the
statute was intended to codify existing common law, the standards applied to the
objective and subjective prongs remain in the jurisdictional province of case law.
Consequently, the enactment of Section 7701(o) is unlikely to result in the desired
clarification in the doctrine’s applicability and unification across circuits.
III. OVERLAP AMONG COMMON LAW DOCTRINES
A long-established principle in Tax Code interpretation is “the importance of
regarding matters of substance and disregarding forms . . . .”72 The substance over
form principle is so integral to tax law as to be regarded as “the cornerstone of sound
taxation.”73 Under the substance over form doctrines, “courts are permitted to ignore
or disregard the text of the Internal Revenue Code on the basis of economic principles
or taxpayer motivation or both.”74 This doctrine is not only enshrined in the text of the
Code, but it also serves as an cannon of construction overarching the tax system in its
entirety. The economic substance doctrine and the step-transaction doctrine are two
well-known variations of the substance over form principle.

70
Id. at 379 (noting “[t]he provision does not alter the court’s ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or
otherwise recharacterize a transaction when applying the doctrine”).
71
See Giordano, supra note 23.
72
Contrast U.S. v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921) (recognizing “the importance of regarding matters
of substance and disregarding form” when interpreting the Tax Code) with Gamble v. United States, 139 S.Ct.
1960 (2019) (demonstrating the Court’s hesitation to liberally interpret Congress’s words––thereby enabling
substance to triumph over form––in other practice areas such as criminal law).
73
Estate of Weinert v. Comm’r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961).
74
Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-Over-Form Doctrines in Tax Law,
43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 701 (2003).
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VARIATIONS OF SUBSTANCE OVER FORM

The economic substance doctrine is but one example of courts elevating the
substance of the Tax Code over its form when evaluating transactions.75 Separate
from, but related to, the economic substance doctrine is the step transaction doctrine,
which enables the IRS and the court to “collapse, combine, or ignore certain steps in a
series of business transactions” if the result “of a series of transactions would have
been the same even without some transitory intermediate steps, or if certain
intermediate steps are “interdependent” with other steps.”76 When applying the test,
court asks “whether certain of the steps have independent, non-tax significance (i.e.
legal or economic consequences which do not depend on the tax consequences).”77 In
the absence of independent significance, the court is enabled to tax the transaction as
a whole, rather than each individual step separately when the steps are all taken in
furtherance of achieving the same result.78
Like the economic substance doctrine, the step transaction doctrine enables courts
to prevent abuse of the Tax Code by refusing to recognize transactions based on their
substance, despite their formal compliance with the law. The step transaction and the
economic substance doctrines are equitable variations of the deeply embedded
substance over form principle. Each doctrine is designed with the aim of giving
priority to congressional intent behind a given Code provision and disregarding
technical compliance when the two conflict. While they all address the same issue,
each doctrine differs in structure.79 While the step transaction doctrine is broader and
is conceivably applicable to any type of transaction. The economic substance doctrine
on the other hand is more specific; its focus is on transactions that seemingly lack
economic substance.
B.

BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS TO EXALTING SUBSTANCE OVER FORM

Substance over form doctrines are often criticized on two primary grounds. First,
they are denounced for the ambiguity between the various doctrines and the
uncertainty this creates. Despite the slight distinctions between the various substance
over form doctrines, “[t]hese common-law doctrines are not entirely distinguishable,
75

See Philip Sancilio, Clarifying (Or is it Codifying?) The “Notably Abstruse”: Step Transactions,
Economic Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 138, 141 (2013) (“The general principle that
taxation should give effect to transactions’ substance, rather than their form, underlies much of tax law and
impels many more specialized doctrines, including the economic substance and step transaction doctrines.”).
76
Michael G. Pfeifer & Sae Jin Yoon, IRS Weapons Against Aggressive Tax Planning, 25 TRUSTS &
TRUSTEES 69, 72 (2019).
77
Id.
78
See MAS One Ltd. P’ship v. U.S., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (explaining “[c]ourts
apply the step transaction doctrine in cases where taxing the individual steps of the transaction rather than the
transaction as a whole would eviscerate the substance of the transaction resulting in improper tax treatment of
the whole transaction”).
79
Under the step transaction doctrine for instance, “finding a step closely related to and integrated into a
larger series may be reason to disregard it. When framing transactions for economic substance analysis,
however, disallowance depends on characterizing a step as ‘outside . . . routine business activities’ or
‘engineered . . . solely for tax purposes.” Sancilio, supra note 75, at n. 119 (quoting Shell Petroleum Inc. v.
United States, Civil Action No. H-05-2016, 2008 WL 2714252, at *36, *38 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2008)).
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and their application to a given set of facts is often blurred by the courts, the IRS, and
litigants.”80 Moreover, “[t]he precise relationship between the economic substance
doctrine and conventional statutory interpretation is ambiguous.”81 The doctrines are
frequently applied in conjunction with one another.82 As one scholar notes, “in order
to reach the same result, the two [tests] need to look at different facts and ask different
questions.”83 Therefore, it may be critical to the taxpayer’s outcome whether the step
transaction, or the economic substance doctrine, is applied to a transaction.
Due to the equitable nature of these common law doctrines, courts are not bound
to agree on their applicability. It may be quite possible that application of either
doctrine could lead to the same conclusion, making the determination of which
doctrine applies irrelevant to the outcome of the case. Nonetheless, certainty is a core
policy objective of the Tax Code. It is imperative to a self-reporting tax system that
taxpayers know ex ante what the potential consequences of a judicial analysis are
before structuring a transaction.84 Due to a conceptual overlap, and ambiguity in the
economic substance doctrine’s relevance, the relationship between the doctrines is
nothing short of confusing for taxpayers, the Service, and courts alike.85 The
uncertainty in outcome is further exasperated by the fact that courts may apply the two
tests to different types of transactions.
All three principles, substance over form, step transaction, and the economic
substance doctrine achieve the unitary goal of disallowing tax benefits in transactions
that undermine the legislative intent of the Code.86 If applied narrowly, there may be
a time and place for application of each individual doctrine. Moreover, some scholars
recognize the interplay between the doctrines and the possibility that there could be
situations that call for their conjunctive application. Nevertheless, the overlap between
the doctrines and the inconsistency with which courts apply them leads to inevitable
confusion and unnecessary complication in the tax system.
In turn, this
unpredictability undermines the integrity of the Tax Code and the taxpayers’
confidence in the broader taxation system as well. Due to the overlap in these common
80
See Sancilio, supra note 75, at 162 (“The doctrines clearly overlap, although the extent of the overlap
varies between courts’ formulations.”).
81
Bankman, supra note 27, at 11–12.
82
Id. at 11 (“Precisely because the doctrine can be applied without formal discussion of text, intent, or
purpose, its application is usually accompanied by, or entwined with, interpretation of the statute using those
conventional tools.”).
83
Sancilio, supra note 75, at n. 119.
84
Even the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation recognizes the danger of leaving too much
interpretation in the hands of the judiciary (conceding that “[a]lthough these doctrines serve an important role
in the administration of the tax system, they can be seen as at odds with an objective, ‘‘rule-based’’ system of
taxation.”). JCS-2-11 at 369.
85
Sancilio, supra note 75, at 160 (“[T]he exact relationship between the [step transaction doctrine and
the economic substance doctrine] is unclear. Disagreement centers on the relevance to the step transaction
inquiry of whether each step in a series, and the series as a whole, has economic substance or a business
purpose.”).
86
Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting “although the taxpayer
has an unquestionable right to decrease or avoid his taxes by means which the law permits, the law does not
allow a taxpayer to reap tax benefits from a transaction that lacks economic reality”). Nonetheless, the Federal
Circuit upheld the doctrine as constitutional because the economic substance doctrine is merely a judicial tool
for effectuating the underlying Congressional purpose that, despite literal compliance with the statute, tax
benefits not be afforded based on transactions lacking economic substance. Id. at 1354.
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law doctrines and the chaos that has resulted, it is not readily apparent why having
each of these separate doctrines is necessary.87
The second line of attack against the substance over form principle is for its broad
statutory construction, which is perceived of as a violation of the separation of powers
for allowing the judiciary to liberally construe the meaning of the Legislature’s
mandates.88 Opinions this extreme, however, often fall on deaf ears. Functionalism is
widely accepted as a necessity to Tax Code interpretation, possibly more so than in
other jurisprudence.89 One possible explanation for this is the endless number of
variations and nuances in transactions, which make Congress inept at addressing each
unique scenario. Alternatively, courts may use this flexible approach as a mechanism
of preventing abuse of tax shelters. Whatever the rationale, courts have traditionally
approached Tax Code interpretation from under a substance over form principal. This
guiding principle enables courts to look past the form of the transaction giving right to
taxable income and question whether in substance, the tax benefit obtained complies
with the statutory intent. In other words, the transaction must not only comply with
the substance, but also the spirit, of the Code.
Regardless of its function, substance over form doctrines serve an important role
in Tax Code interpretation. Where vagueness can be perceived as a vice, it can also
be viewed as a virtue. As one scholar noted, “in some areas, [substance over form
doctrines] are influential primarily because they are vague; when the meaning of a
provision is veiled by fog, taxpayers may tread more warily than when the landmarks
are clearly visible.”90 This ambiguity in interpretation serves as a general deterrent to
suspect transactions and encourage taxpayers to err on the side of caution. Whether
the uncertainty this creates is an adequate price to pay for this general deterrent is
subject to debate.
IV. BALANCING COMPETING OBJECTIVES
When Judge Hand first articulated the economic substance doctrine in its
preliminary form, it served as a means of preventing tax avoidance and abuse of
favorable Tax Code provisions. Nearly a century later, the principle’s aim remains
fundamentally unchanged. The economic substance doctrine’s overarching objective
is two-fold. On the one hand, courts employ the doctrine to “set boundaries between

87
See Madison, supra note 74, at 722 (“These attempts [to use substance over form principles to prevent
Tax Code abuse] have resulted in chaos. The various courts of appeals have not agreed on which substanceover-form doctrines apply, how the doctrines apply, or when the doctrines apply.”).
88
Id. at 703 (“The basis for textualist interpretation rests on a theory of separation of powers inherent in
American democracy.”).
89
See, e.g., Diedrich v. Comm’r, 457 U.S. 191 (1982) (affirming that “[t]he substance, not the form, of
the agreed transaction controls in determining whether taxable income was realized”).
90
See BITTKER & LOKKEN, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines, in FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES,
& GIFTS ¶ 4.3 (1989). Demonstrating his support for this view, Justice Brandeis drew the following analogy:
“If you are walking along a precipice no human being can tell you how near you can go to that precipice
without falling over, because you may stumble on a loose stone, you may slip, and go over; but anybody can
tell you where you can walk perfectly safely within convenient distance of that precipice.” Id. at ¶ 4.3.1.
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acceptable tax planning and abuse.”91 Delineating the line between tax planning and
tax abuse can be thought of in terms of as judicial Code interpretation as a means of
giving effect to legislative intent. On the other hand, the economic substance doctrine
is a means of “maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the tax system.”92
These objectives are arguably at odds.93 By giving effect to legislative intent, courts
invariably elevate substance above form. Yet in doing so, taxpayers are left without
certainty when it comes to tax planning. Whether the economic substance doctrine
successfully strikes a balance between these two competing objectives is the subject
of much scholarly debate.
A.

EFFECTUATING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

The I.R.C. and Treasury Regulations, like any other statute or administrative
regulation, are incomplete without judicial interpretation. Clarifying hazy Code
provisions and preventing unintended tax consequences can be thought of more
broadly as the judiciary giving effect to congressional intent. Judicial Tax Code
interpretation is particularly integral to tax law for two reasons.
First, due to its rule-based nature, the Code “cannot efficiently prescribe the
appropriate outcome of every conceivable transaction that might be devised . . . .”94
Consequently, anti-abuse doctrines like the economic substance doctrine, substance
over form, and the step transaction doctrine enable the judiciary to give effect to
legislative intent. Legislative intent has been dubbed the “touchstone of the economic
substance doctrine” because of its role in determining “whether the treatment goes
beyond the tax benefits that Congress intended to grant.”95 Courts can use the
economic substance doctrine as a mechanism to defend and preserve the Tax Code as
written by Congress.
Critics of the economic substance doctrine attack the doctrine on the grounds that
it unduly expands the power of the judiciary, affording them the power to legislate. As
articulated by the Court of Federal Claims, using the doctrine “to trump mere
compliance with the Code would violate the separation of powers . . . .”96 Moreover,
the First Circuit has argued this about legislative intent:
The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law
shall be, and if it is intimated its will, however indirectly, that will
should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the
conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces
to be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for
91
ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. 1997-115 1997 WL 93314, at *36, aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
ACM P’ship v. C.I.R. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
92
Id.
93
See generally Madison, supra note 74.
94
See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE
111TH CONGRESS 369, 378 (JCS-2-11, March 2011).
95
Id.
96
Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004) (slip opinion at 123–24, 128); vacated
and remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007) (quotations omitted).
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courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have no said
it, and therefore we shall go on as before.97
Similarly, the economic substance doctrine also serves as a guard against Tax
Code manipulation and abuse. As a result of its rule-based nature, the Code inevitably
leaves ample room for taxpayer discretion. Despite the immense level of detail in the
Code, its effectiveness depends in part on a degree of broadness. However, with
discretion comes corresponding room for abuse. Tax abuse transactions rely “upon
the interaction of highly technical tax law provisions to produce tax consequences not
contemplated by Congress.”98 The principal virtue of anti-abuse doctrines, like the
economic substance doctrine, lies in the courts ability to prevent taxpayers from using
the Code to generate favorable tax benefits in situations unintended by Congress.
Take tax shelters, for example. “Tax shelter” is an umbrella term used to describe
transactions designed to reduce tax liability such that the tax benefits received exceed
“any actual profit or loss sustained from participation in the transaction.”99 A
successful tax shelter allows the taxpayer to receive tax benefits from a particular
transaction that offset the amount of taxable income derived from the transaction. Tax
shelter transactions are often characterized by “the completion of certain formalistic
steps to claim the desired tax result”100 yet are identifiable by their “unusually high
transaction costs that are borne, in whole or substantial part, by the corporate
beneficiary.”101 Transactions involving tax shelters are typically in technical
compliance with a strict application of the Tax Code but combine provisions in such a
way that is not intended or anticipated by the legislature.102 Tax shelters are
undesirable both from practical and policy viewpoints. As a practical matter, the
primary objective of federal income taxation is raising revenue. Tax shelters directly
undercut this aim by resulting in dramatic losses of revenue.103 Corporate tax shelters
are disfavored on the grounds that they “threaten[] the effectiveness of the current
system because of the potential drain on revenue and the threat to the integrity of the
self-assessment tax system.”104 Moreover, as a matter of public policy, when
corporations take more than their fair share of tax deductions, the tax burden inevitably
shifts onto the shoulders of individual taxpayers who inevitably must compensate for

97

Johnson v. US, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
JCS-2-11 at 378.
Gerald W. Miller, Jr., Corporate Tax Shelters and Economic Substance: An Analysis of the Problem
and Its Common Law Solution, 34 TX TECH. L. REV. 1015, 1019.
100
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, 17 (1999).
101
Id. at 23.
102
Miller, supra note 99, at 1025.
103
As one scholar explained, “[a] rule that allows taxpayers to take advantage of loopholes that naturally
present themselves in the course of business operations will be expensive to the federal coffers, but that cost
will be limited to the number of ‘naturally present’ loopholes.” Bankman, supra note 27, at 11. In contrast,
“[a] rule that allows taxpayers not only to take advantage of loopholes but to manufacture circumstances in
which they arise would be ruinous to the fisc.” Id.
104
Anthony B. Casarona, Regulating Corporate Tax Shelters: Seeking Certainty in a Complex World, 50
CATH. U. L. REV. 111, 112 (2000).
98
99
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the lost Treasury revenue.105 In this way, tax shelters directly undercut principles of
equity underlying sound tax policy.
The economic substance doctrine has been regarded as the IRS’s “most effective
tool” in combatting tax shelters.106 However, scholars in this field generally will be
the first to concede that the line delineating tax avoidance and legitimate tax planning
is often blurry.107 Tax planning is both permissible and advisable in the practice of tax
law.108 The objective of tax planning is to structure one’s finances in such a way as to
minimize tax liability without “crossing the line into impermissible tax avoidance or
tax evasion.”109 As a result of the inherent ambiguity in such transactions, anti-abuse
doctrines run the risk of over-inclusion. If the legislation is too broad, and courts are
eager to disallow transactions with indicia of suspect tax mitigation, there is a risk of
deterring efficient, legitimate behavior.
B.

MAINTAINING CONFIDENCE IN THE CODE

If the economic substance doctrine’s primary objective is to give effect to
congressional intent by disallowing unintended tax benefits, the doctrine’s secondary
aim is to maintain taxpayer confidence in the system as a whole.110 Transactions that
take advantage of an ambiguous, or broadly-worded Code provision undermine the
Code’s authority by creating an environment in which such behavior is normalized.
The economic substance doctrine intervenes as an equitable doctrine allowing the law
to reach the “right” result. This rationale holds for transactions engineered to
unlawfully evade taxation. However, the argument in favor of the economic substance
doctrine and other anti-abuse doctrines does not hold when applied to transactions
taken in good faith attempt to take advantage of the taxpayer-friendly Code provisions.
The Tax Code is filled with favorable provisions intended by Congress to provide
tax relief.111 Moreover, there is nothing criminal about arranging one’s affairs so as to
minimize tax liability.112 The Third Circuit even endorsed such tax saving behavior,
assuring that the court does not “suggest that a taxpayer refrain from using the tax laws
to the taxpayer's advantage.”113 Additionally, “a transaction, otherwise within an
105
See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN
THE 111TH CONGRESS 369, 378 (JCS-2-11, March 2011) (noting that the consequence of successful tax

shelters is to “enlarge the tax gap by gaining unintended tax relief and by undermining the overall integrity of
the tax system”).
106
Miller, supra note 99, at 1017–18.
107
See Lauren O’Malley, Delineating Permissible Tax Planning and Abusive Tax Avoidance: Tax
Shelters, Pre-Tax Profit, and the Foreign Tax Credit, 36 B.U. INT’L L. J. 143 (2018).
108
See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 90, ¶ 4.3.2 (“Tax planning is as American as apple pie.”).
109
See O’Malley, supra note 107, at 145.
110
See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 90, ¶ 4.3.2.
111
Id.
112
Not only is this line ambiguous, but it is also “hard to fault a taxpayer who engages in a transaction
with significant nontax results (for example, operating a business as a proprietorship rather than in corporate
for, or selling property rather than continuing to hold it)” because “even though this decision is motivated
more by the tax savings to be achieved than by the transaction's other consequences.” Id.
113
ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. 1997-115 1997 WL 93314, at *36, aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
ACM P’ship v. C.I.R. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (differentiating the case at hand as one where “the taxpayer
desired to take advantage of a loss that was not economically inherent in the object of the sale, but which the
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exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire
to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation.”114 Rather, under this longstanding
principle,
[o]ne may so arrange his affairs so that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay
the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes
. . . there is nothing sinister in so arranging affairs as to keep taxes as
low as possible. Everyone does it, rich and poor alike and all do right,
for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law
demands.115
Anti-abuse doctrines like the economic substance doctrine can have the unintended
consequence of creating uncertainty for taxpayers who seek to take advantage of a
favorable Code provision, who believe in good in faith that Congress intended the
provision to apply to their particular situation.116 In effect, this uncertainty and
confusion subverts the integrity of the Tax Code.
Consistency and certainty are imperative to the integrity of the Tax Code, as well
as to sound tax policy.117 Taxpayers rely on the letter of the Code when planning their
financial affairs. Likewise, taxpayers should not be penalized, or dissuaded from,
minimizing their tax liability through legitimate transactions in accordance with
favorable Code provisions. The law governing tax shelters has been described as a
“patchwork of ambiguous statutory authority, which is sometimes arbitrarily applied
to the detriment of legitimate business transactions.”118 It is often difficult to discern
the difference between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax evasion. Therefore, it
is a delicate balance between using the economic substance doctrine to defend against
corporate tax shelters and incentivizing legitimate business transactions.
V. A CALL FOR SIMPLIFICATION IN TAX CODE INTERPRETATION
The U.S. tax system is undoubtedly complex.119 Taxpayers who wish to anticipate
the tax implications of a transaction and plan their affairs accordingly must first
interpret the I.R.C., Treasury Regulations, revenue rulings, and announcements. This
alone is a daunting task. To add to the mix, interpreting these provisions in light of
relevant case law makes navigating the Tax Code all the more challenging.130 With
such copious amounts of rules, “it would seem that Congress, the Department of
Treasury, and the IRS have communicated to taxpayers exactly what they need to
taxpayer created actually through the manipulation and abuse of the tax laws.”). The court concluded, “[a]
taxpayer is not entitled to recognize a phantom loss from a transaction that lacks economic substance.” Id.
114
Id.
115
See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 90, ¶ 4.3.2.
116
See generally Madison, supra note 74.
117
Casarona, supra note 104, at 137.
118
Id. at 130.
119
Madison, supra note 74, at 716 (“Tax law is complex.”).
130
Id.
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know to plan their affairs and determine the precise amount of tax to pay the
government each year.”131 Unfortunately for taxpayers, that is not always a reality.
Despite legislative efforts to enhance Code specificity, determining the tax
implications of a given transaction is often ambiguous. The “vague, complex judicial
doctrines,” such as substance over form and the economic substance doctrine, can
often make the outcome of a given transaction unpredictable.132 As a result of the
inevitable ambiguity in the Code, taxpayers may be left with more than one legitimate
way to structure a given transaction. When presented with a choice, the rational
taxpayer will effect the transaction which results in lower taxable income. There is
nothing inherently wrong with structuring transactions so as to minimize the tax
burden. In fact, designing a transaction with the intent of achieving the most beneficial
tax implications is a seemingly prudent business decision. Moreover, not only does
the Tax Code provide room for creativity in structuring tax minimizing transactions,
but the Code also provides in numerous instances an intent to afford a tax break to
specific groups of people or to incentivize certain behavior. The taxpayer should not
have to inquire into the legislative history of each Code section when completing his
annual tax return.
Certainty, clarity, and predictability are integral to sound tax policy. Certainty
enables taxpayers to plan their finances and proactively structure transactions so as to
achieve an intended result. In order to avoid crossing the line between permissible tax
planning and tax evasion, taxpayers must be aware of where that line is. In addition,
clarity can help cultivate uniformity in the law’s application which in turn can enhance
equity. The principle of horizontal equity, a fundamental value in tax policy, requires
similarly situated taxpayers to be afforded equal treatment under the law. Without
horizontal equity, taxpayers can feel they have been treated unfairly by the tax law and
will have less faith in the tax system as a result.
Tax Code interpretation is in dire need of simplification. The U.S. tax system is
riddled with complex, overlapping statutes, regulations, and common law doctrines.
This ambiguity underlines clarity in the Code and uniformity in Code interpretation.
Judicially crafted common law doctrines, like the economic substance doctrine, is a
substantial contributor to this complexity. Because many of these doctrines all aim to
effectuate legislative intent, the overlap between these doctrines further exacerbates
the confusion.133
While it may provide the flexibility courts require to adequately assess the
multitude of scenarios arising in the tax context, this principal further exacerbates
taxpayer uncertainty. When is compliance with the strict letter of the Code sufficient,
131

Id.
Id. (“These detailed statutory provisions, regulations, rulings, procedures, and announcements
commingle with another dimension of vague, complex judicial doctrines, the most pervasive of which come
from the substance-over-form family of doctrines.”).
133
One scholar explained, “[i]t is precisely because of our commitment to this relatively objective system
that we loathe to overturn the "technical" results which arise from the application of complex rules to complex
business transactions.” David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235,
237 (1999). Moreover, taxpayers are entitled to “rely on the rules and the answers to which those rules give
rise. She should not be denied beneficial tax results which she stumbles upon, or even seeks out, in the course
of her legitimate business dealings, even if those results are obviously unanticipated, unintended or downright
undesirable.” Id.
132
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and when is it not? The pervasive application of the substance over form doctrine has
been criticized for “remov[ing] hope for certainty in tax planning.”134 So long as the
“substance-over-form doctrines still are valid, the IRS and the courts have a choice as
to whether or not they want to follow the text of the statute.”135 As a result, taxpayers
are left “to guess whether the IRS or a court will find that a transaction “smells bad”
and thus will use one of the doctrines to override the text of the Code.”136
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the codification of the economic substance doctrine has been far
from successful in attaining its stated objective of clarifying the common law doctrine.
Rather than simplifying the Code’s interpretation and application, Section 7701(o) has
introduced unnecessary complexity into the tax system. As the doctrine evolved,
circuit courts diverged in their application of the doctrine. Prior to the statutory
enactment some circuits were applying a disjunctive version of the test, while others
were applying the doctrine in its conjunctive form. While the doctrine’s codification
successfully eliminated this discrepancy, the legislation left much discretion in the
hands of the judiciary. Rather than displacing the common law doctrine, Section
7701(o) supplements its application and allows courts to continue applying the
economic substance doctrine in accordance with common law practice. Consequently,
Congress failed to attain its stated objective of clarifying the doctrine’s application and
eliminating disparities between Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. This ambiguity in
interpretation undermines the doctrines effectiveness and subverts the Tax Code’s
integrity.
The confusion surrounding the economic substance doctrine’s proper role in tax
law is further complicated by the barrage of common law doctrines, including the step
transaction and the substance over form doctrines, each of which purports to serve a
similar purpose as that of the economic substance doctrine: giving effect to legislative
intent and preventing taxpayers from abusing the Code. However, the ambiguity and
lack of clarity surrounding the relationship between these common law doctrines
further exacerbates the confusion in Tax Code interpretation. As a result, taxpayers
are left with seemingly little guidance when it comes to arranging transactions so as to
attain benefits explicitly afforded to them by Congress via the Tax Code. Even when
in technical compliance with the Code, taxpayers are still subject to the scrutiny of the
courts on the grounds that the substance of a transaction conflicts with legislative
intent. This inevitably subverts clarity in the Code and confidence in the overarching
tax system. Uniformity, clarity, and integrity are integral values in a well-functioning
tax system. Taxpayers have a right to predictability when arranging their finances and
certainty that courts will not retroactively criminalize them for complying with the
letter of the law. In the words of Judge Learned Hand, “[t]he language of the law must
not be foreign to the ears of those who are to obey it.”137
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